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The purpose of the thesis is to utilize the realist-
neorealist paradigm to analyze the United States policy
objectives in West Africa, comparably to other African
regions. The basic premise of the realist paradigm
purports that states are unitary actors and they act to
protect their national interest.
Through a critical analysis of secondary data, my
findings clearly point to the fact that the former
colonial powers, Britain and France are the major actors in
West Africa not the United States. The United States
policy strategy centers solely on the crisis areas of other
regions, the Horn, Central Africa and Southern Africa.
This is because of the power struggle between the super
powers and because these areas are endowed with vast
mineral resources. The Nigerian oil and Chadian conflict
with Libya are the only two areas of U.S. interest in West
Africa.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
Statement of Purpose
Modern students of world politics have sought to
explain the contents and dynamics of interstate relations
through two competing paradigms, the classical tradition
and Marxism. The most influential Western efforts have
converged in what K. J. Holsti calls the "Classical
tradition" encompassing both Liberalism and Realism.
But for over a century a contending paradigm based
on Marxism has challenged the assumptions of the classical
tradition. For Marxist scholars class conflict is" basic in
the explication of competing interests of sovereign states:
for capitalism creates both exploitation and interstate
conflict, particularly in the form of imperialism.
The present effort seeks to propose a "middle range"
approach that can be applied in the analysis of U.S. policy
objectives in the West African region. The middle-range
approach derived its theory from a synthesis of both
Realism and Neorealism.
The thesis aims to demonstrate by using the middle
range approach rather than Marxism, how the United States
sets its policy strategies. Both Realism and Neorealism
purport that states act to protect their national interest.
And due to the super power struggle for influence in the
crisis areas of African regions, West Africa is relatively
unimportant to U.S. policy calculations. The U.S. allies,
Britain and France who were the former colonial powers, not
the U.S. remain the pre-eminent threat to regional
stability in West Africa.
Historical Background
The European Convention of 1885 marked the staking
out of official claims in Africa by the various European
1
powers. Britain, France and Portugal (to a lesser extent)
asserted their influences in West Africa. The United
States however, maintains a relationship with Liberia which
continued after the country's independence in 1847. Thus,
America's official interest in Africa before World War I
centered largely on Liberia. Diplomatic relation of
Liberia with the United States was complicated by the fact
that the very existence of an independent black republic
negated for many European colonialists, the kind of
2
legitimacy that the colonial powers accorded each other.
1
P. Yarborough, Trial in Africa; The Failure
of U. S. Policy (Washington, D. C: French/Bray).
Peter Duignan and L. H. Gahn, The U. S. and Africa A
History, (London: Macmillan 1984), p. 205.
Liberia, yet they supported the country in such a manner,
The Americans avoided taking direct responsibility for
Liberia, yet they supported the country in such a manner,
as to preserve Liberia's independence, while at the same
time, salving the exaggerated pride that then was widely
the characteristics of the Great power in the attitude
3
toward small and weak states. Undoubtedly, it was
America's influence that prevented Liberia from being
absorbed by one or another of the major colonial empires.
After World War II, America established a decisive
interest in Africa. President Franklin Roosevelt insisted
on decolonization of European colonies in the Third World
in general and especially in Africa. Following the
struggles for independence (see chapter two), the European
countries finally granted the majority of the African
states their semi-sovereignty, for the former European
power continued to sway their former colonies. I used the
term semi-sovereignty here because some scholars still
argue that neo-colonialism still persists in Third World.
Therefore, these nations are not totally independent so to
speak.
The research problem is whether or not the West
African region is vital to the U.S. policy measures. Or,
3
Ibid. p. 206.
whether the U.S. neglect of this region is due to the
established presence of U.S. allies (European powers).
The Hypothesis:
The United States minimal engagement in West Africa
is due to the lack of super power tension in that area.
Compared to the Horn, Northern Africa and Southern African
regions, West Africa is not a strategic location to U.S.
policy objectives.
Research Questions;
-Is there a correlation between U.S. interest in vital
Africa mineral resources and policy calculations?
-Whether or not there is a relationship between super
power zero-sum game and policy objectives.
-Does the U.S. as a rational actor act to protect its
self interest?
-To what extent is West Africa vital to U.S.?
Theoretical Basis
Since the birth of the modern nation-state in
Western Europe, a single paradigm has held sway over
efforts to theorize about global politics. Variously
called "power politics," the "billard ball model,"
"political realism" and the "state centric model," this
paradigm assumes global politics to be a contest for power
4
among sovereign nation-states in an anarchic environment.
Its key tenets have been passed down from generation to
generation by historian and political theorists as varied
as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Ranke. In the
United States, its basic ideas were reinforced and
systematized during and after World War II by a group of
scholars including Nicholas Spykman, E. H. Carr, Hans
Morganthau, George Kennan, and Robert Osgood. They were
reacting to what they saw as "errors made by advocates of
idealism with their emphasis on national self
determination, international law, political community, and
5
morality during the interwar period."
The peace of Westphalia of 1648, which brought to an
end the religious wars of Europe must be regarded as the
crucial historical step in the evolution and acceptance of
a paradigm of global politics, which features "power" and
"state" as core concepts. Westphalia is said to have
"legislated into existence" the system of states that has
6
provided a focus for much of the discipline. It signified
4
"Sub-Saharan African and U.S. Policy"
Department of State Bulletin, December 1985.
5
Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Relationsr
(Massachussete:, Addison-Wesley, 1972), p 2.
6
E. H. Carr, The Twenty Year Crisis 1919-1939.
(London: Macmillan, 1946) and Thomas L. Cook and Malcolm
Moss, Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism As A
for Foreign Policy. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1954).
the victory of secular princes over the imperial
pretensions of feudal barons and provided the basis for the
growth of a detailed system of international law that
"legitimized the authority of these monarchs personal
property into the legal fiction of the sovereign state with
the ascribed legal characteristics corollary of non
intervention in the internal affairs of such sovereign
7
kingdoms."
Hans Morganthau summarized the impact of that age—
the appearance of a central political power that exercised
its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority for the single
stake of power. Understanding how and why that struggle
for influence occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it,
is the purpose of the study of world politics.
The key insight underlying these assumptions relates
to the realist understanding of power. Nation states are
seen as the critical actors, because they alone are
sovereign and can marshal the necessary resources to wield
power. For Morganthau, they are the "ultimate point of
8
reference of contemporary foreign policy." In domestic
7
Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez, In Search of
Theory; A New Paradigm for Global Politics . (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1981}> p 3.
8
See, Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-
1948," in Robert S. Wood. ed. The Process of International
Organization (New York: Random House, 1971)
politics a single actor, the government has sufficient
power to regulate the activities of all other entities in
society, producing a certain measure of order and
tranquility; in the international arena, there is no such
leviathan. Therefore, in such an "anarchic" environment,
each nation state must struggle to maintain, if not to
increase its power; otherwise it will be crushed. These
assumptions of struggle for influence or control have
influenced "world politics that has been within a certain
parameter as elevating these political facts into a legal
theory, and giving them, both moral approbation and
9
appearance of legal necessity."
While there has been little research of a systematic
sort on the role of paradigms in international relations
inquiry, a belief that the power politics approach-has been
the guiding intellectual force in the modern period is
10
widely accepted.
The realist paradigm can be said to consist of three
fundamental assumptions:
-Nation-states and/or decision makers are the most
important set of actors to examine in order to account
for behavior in international politics.
9
Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, (New
York: Knopf, 1950), p. 10.
10
Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 5.
-Political life is bifurcated into "domestic" and
"international" spheres, each subject to its own
characteristic traits, and laws of behavior.
-International relations is the struggle for power and
peace.
This struggle for power and peace constitutes a single
issue occurring in a single system and entails a ceaseless
repetitive competition for this single state of power.
Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and
suggesting ways for regulating it, is the purpose of the
disciple. These assumptions have provided a core belief
about world politics that have been shared by scholars as
diverse as A. F. K. Organski, Thomas Schelling, David J.
Singer, Inis Claude, Karl Deustch, E. H. Carr and R. J.
11
Rummel. Our main concern here is to explain U.S. minimal
engagement in West Africa within the Realist/Neo-realist
context. Other leading neo-realist scholars include
Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Richard Rosecranece and Robert
Tucker (see Chapter Four for full discussion of neorealism).
According to John Spanier, the basic purpose of
American foreign policy, after all is the protection of a
12




John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since
World War II, (New York: CBS College Publishing, 1983),
p. 326.
America's counter balancing power that has protected
democratic values; without that power, Soviet power and
Soviets social values and order would have prevailed.
Freedom in the world, in short, is ultimately tied to
American power. As Kissinger (while Secretary of State)
expressed it, "if we do not lead, no other nations that
stand for what we believe in, can take our place."
The Horn of Africa, North Africa, and Southern Africa are
areas of strategic American policy designs in Africa,
because of the East-West tension. Therefore, America is
protecting its national interest by establishing its
presence in those areas. Specifically put, the U.S.
involvement is related to America's geo-political needs in
terms of configuration of power.
Research Method
The conclusion reached within this study will be
based on critical analysis of secondary data. This method
facilitates comparative analysis of U.S. policy patterns in
various African regions. Also invasion of privacy




William B. Sanders and Thomas Pinkney, The Conduct
of Social Research,(New York: CBS College Publishing,
1983), p. 198.
The data sources are from key documents that
describe U.S. policy objectives and program in various
African regions, as well as those that illuminate trends in
communication context by important U.S. foreign policy
actors, will be audited against objective standards.
Some of these are U.S. government documents and
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce-
International Trade administrations; U.S. House Commission
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, the U.S.
Senate Commission on Foreign Relations; the U.S. Department
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Historian;
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census; U.S. the
Agency for International Development, Bureau of External
Affairs; the U.S. Department of Defense; and United Nation
Chronicle. Other sources will be obtained from leading
journals and texts.
These official documents will be analyzed to
determine:
-Comparative mineral contribution of the West African
region into the so-called strategic minerals.
-Pattern of trade between the U.S. and the region.
-Comparative U.S. military presence in the region.
-U.S. foreign aids
-U.S. interest and West African geo-politics
The method of analysis is derived from a basic premise
that:
10
States are the unit level of analysis. They are
rational egoists.
The U.S. foreign policy is inextricably linked to
the following:
-Advancement of U.S. military machines
-Dependable source of raw materials throughout
the world
-And maintenance of a high standard of living
rather than issues of morality.14
These assumptions were re-echoed in a March 1986 speech by
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Chester Crocker. In the speech, Mr. Crocker confirms that
U.S. African interest is based on these broad categories:
developmental issues, strategic, political and economic
concerns. This is an indication of U.S. awareness that
Africa is part of a broader global system.
Literature Review:
Major literatures on U.S. relations in Africa are
generally deficient on the West African region. The focus
is invariably on the continent in general or, on specific
crisis areas in the various regions.
Mark Delancey identifies three major areas of
orthodox study: First, major African problem (e. g.
14
New York Times, February 17, 1987.
11
Southern Africa, the Horn and boundaries). Second, African
foreign policies (including case and comparative studies
and international organizations both African and
EuroAfrica). Third, the African policies of major (and
15
minor) states with the great power.
Michael Radu's essay on "Ideology, Parties, and
African Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," asserts that
there is a dramatic upsurge in the number of Sub-Saharan
states claiming allegiance to Marxist-Leninist and/or
revolutionary socialism during the 1970s.16 He argues that
ideology may in the long run affect their economic
development. Radu in effect, analyzes the importance,
trends, and implications of Marxist ideology (in its
various forms) for the internal political and economic
development of African states, for their foreign pplicy,
and for Western interest in Africa.
Internal disputes and U.S. policy options in Africa
is also a major area of study. Ogene F. Chidozie writes on
U.S. policymaking during the Congo crisis 1960-64; the
Nigerian civil war 1967-70; the importation of Rhodesian
15
See Mark H. Delancey, "The Study of African
Lonal Relations" in his Aspects of International
Relations in Africa, (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 1 - 38,
Pnl. v V6McCKa;\RadU' "Ideol°gy. Parties, and Foreign




chrome 1971-73; and on U.S. South African relations.
The progressive American economist Stewart Smith has
examined America's economic, political, cultural and
military policy in Africa. He explains the continent-wide
picture of U.S. corporate profiteering and expansion in
Africa with necessary details for each major country and
area.1 Smith illuminates the flexible political strategy
of U.S. imperialism, its reliance everywhere on
reactionery exploitive class. According to the economist,
the upper class suppresses the masses and barters national
sovereignty to the interests of imperialism in general and
U.S. imperialism in specific, be it the fascist racist
regime of South Africa, or the bureaucratic capitalist ones
in the same newly independent countries. Furthermore, he
pentagon: suppression of the liberation movements"within
the continent and the use of African bases and resources
as a cistern of growing importance in the global
19
configuration with communism.
As African states probe for a political identity,
distinct from the colonial past, the super powers jostle
17 Ogene F. Chidozie, Interest and the Shaping of
Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies of the-U.S. African
Policy Policy (New York: St. Martins, 1984) p. 5.
18 Stewart Smith, U.S. Neo-colonialism in Africa,




for influence. For the U.S. and its allies, the aim is
to preserve political, economic and strategic dominance
over much of a continent known to possess immense mineral
resources and other riches on which many key Western
industries rely. For the Soviet Union, and its friends,
the stake is to challenge that dominance by planting seeds
of socialism in the African soil or by seeking to deny the
West access to Africa's economic resources and strategic
facilities. Arthur Gavshon graphically details this state
20
of affairs in his Crisis in Africa.
Frederick S. Arkhurst in his collection of essays
follows similar trend of thought in his U.S. Policy Towards
Africa (New York, Praeger 1975). This collection reviews
U.S. African relation: from historical developmental
perspective (Immanuel Wallerstein) through contemporary
policy in specific regions (Herbert J. Spiro) to South
Africa and the entire issues of politico economic
calculations.
The global balance of power, involving nuclear
stalemate and mutual deterrence, tends to make a conflict
between the main industrial powers improbable. Tensions in
the Third World often result in warfare and inevitably
engage the partisan interest of Soviet Union and the U.S.
20
Arthur Gavshon, Crisis In Africa: Battleground of
East and West. (New York: Pengium Book, 1981), p. 1 - 20.
14
They may become deeply committed to their embattled
clients, as in the Horn, or seek to enhance their own
influence. Africa is most of the time influenced by
asserts that national interest are subjective
determinations formulated with reference to the shared
American perception and misperceptions of Soviet intension
and capabilities. This critique is documented by Gerald J.
Bender and his co-editors. The crisis areas are Southern
Africa, the Horn, Zaire and Northern Africa. The editor
contends that perceptions and misperceptions of a nation's
capabilities in the system affects the values of a national
21
entity.
Robert M. Price also writes on these vital issues of
U.S. national interest and global strategy in Africa. He
lays strong emphasis on the zero-sum game between the super
powers. But he clearly pointed out that Soviets' influence
in the crisis areas does not threaten the American status-
quo. The American perception in this instance is largely
illusory. As for U.S. economic interest in Africa, Robert
Price affirms that based on statistics, Africa is of no
significance to America. For only three percent of U.S.
21
Gerald Bender, Coleman James and Richard Sklar ed.
African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Berkley,
University of California press, 1985). '
15
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direct investments abroad is found in Africa. This claim
is, to say the least, very questionable to this writer.
America, in my opinion, cannot afford to loose its grip on
the huge African mineral deposit.
The heavy reliance by the U.S. and other industrial
democracies on minerals imported from the region south of
Sahara (Zaire for instance) raises policy problems and
choices in the 1980s. Concern about continued access
focuses particularly on South Africa, which dominates world
export of four minerals (chromium, manganese, vanadium, and
platinum), that have both industrial and militarv
23
significance. The fact that the Soviet Union is the
principal alternative source of gold, vanadiun, platinium
and manganese, called for U.S. policy stance in that area.
A study published in 1983 on the economic and
political implications of sudden oil wealth in a range of
African countries makes the same basic point, on Africa's
economic significance to the U.S. Oil resources are
located in some West African countries (Nigeria, Cameroon,
and Ivory Coast ranked top with their oil reserves). In
22
Robert M. Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in
Sub Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy
(Berkeley, Regents of University of California, 1978),
p. 1 - 60.
23
Helen H. Kitchen, U.S. Interest in Africa. (New
York: Praeger 1980), p. 40.
16
1980, oil export accounts for 90 percent of Nigeria's
24
foreign exchange. Nigeria is now the second largest oil
supplier (following Saudi Arabia) to U.S. Nigeria's
leaders have threatened to use their oil weapon as a last
resort if they felt the Reagan administration tilted too
far toward South Africa.25
The basic U.S. interest in West Africa apart from
oil is the spread of radical Arab influence in West Africa
(containment of Quaddafi). Donald Rothchild and John
Ravenhill posit that this is the U.S. objective in West
Africa.26 Chad is under seige from Libya, whose forces
occupy the northern third of the country. The U.S.
bilateral support for Chad, demonstrates its resolve to
help African nations counter aggression.
African debt problems also received scholarly
scrutiny. During the 1960s, African governments benefited
from high commodity prices and generous foreign aid.
Government revenue was supplemented by borrowing from




Weekly Review (Nairobi), April 1978. p. 45.
26
Tmn^H ^°l&' £ieber and Rothchild, eds. Eagle Defiant:
United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s. (Kn*+nrr r.ij-lio
Brown Co. 1985). " bJl"ie'
27
c i, o u chester Crocker, "Fy 1987 Assistance Request for
Sub-Saharan Africa," Current Policy. December 1987 p. 814.
17
recession in the 1970s, however, the prices of Africa
exports plummeted while the cost of imports remained high.
Trade imbalance was the outcome. Nigeria is one West
African nation with the foreign debt amounting up to $12
28
billion. The Nigerian debt service, rescheduling, and
re-borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, received
major literary attention. My research will show that the
U.S. as a rational actor, does not consider West Africa as
an area of high stakes compared to U.S. policy interests
in the crisis African areas.
The study is in four chapters: the first is a
general introduction and review of literature on the U.S.
African relation and analysis of theoretical basis of the
study realism and neorealism.
Chapter Two examines the historical, political, and
developmental setting of West African states. Because
Western powers (Britain, and France in particular)
colonized the area of Africa, their presence clearly limits
the Soviets influence in the region.
Chapter three presents data on U.S. interest in
Africa as a whole. This states in detail the U.S. energy
policy, U.S. sales and donations under Food for Peace,
28
M- Harman, "Down with Naira" Economist, vol 299,
May 3, 1986.
18
U. S. foreign aid, particularly economic, U.S. security
interest and trade issues.
The final chapter analyzes the data in Chapter III,
within the context of the realist-neorealist paradigm.
It concludes with a prognostication of the future of West
Africa in super power contest for the African countries.
19
CHAPTER II
EUROPEAN COLONIZATION AND DE-COLONIZATION OF WEST AFRICA
One thing has checked the development
these rich regions—native misrule.
A. F. Mockler - Ferryman, "British
Nigeria" JAS, 11(1902): p. 169
The West African region was colonized mainly by
two European powers, Britain and France. This attempt was
a direct consequence of the European scramble and partition
of Africa, in extension of their quest for imperial
domination of the most of the area contemporarily known as
the Third World. In West Africa, "native misrule" was the
rationale for imposition of control by these powers.
Accumulation of resources superceded thereafter. From the
last quarter of the nineteenth century to the early third
quarter of the 20th century, most of West Africa
experienced colonization. This area even after European
domination inherited the colonial legacy that still tied
them politically and economically to the former colonial
powers.
European Colonization of West Africa: British
In West Africa, colonial build-up occurred in areas
where commercial relation with Europe were most developed.
20
For instance on the Gold Coast, the forts controlled by the
Dutch and the British were rationalized geographically by
agreement in 1867. This introduced a period of uncertainty
as old alliances, commercial and political, were called
1
into question.
By 1871, the Dutch were bought off the western forts
and Asante had threatened to restore its old hegemony over
most of the coast. Britain was not ready to tolerate such
development. It, therefore, organized an invasion. As a
result, Asante state was destablized. Alliances were made
with various former sub-ordinate rulers who now refused to
support the Asante Hene. The Crown shortly annexed the
2
coastal territories, Gold Coast colony. By 1896, the
British found excuse for war and Asante was conquered.
The Gold Coast now was annexed as a suitable hinterland.
As it went, the rest of the West African area was
partitioned by Britain and France.
The Niger delta, the heartland of the palm oil
trade, was one of the great regions of commercial interest
to Europe in West Africa. The delta area experienced an
1
The European colonization of this region did not
necessarily mean first appearance of Europeans to the
scene. Slavery existed on this area. After abolition of
slave trade, there were other established commercial ties.
2
Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa:
The Development of African Society Since 1800.
(Bloomington, Indiana: Univ Press, 1984), p.91.
21
intense version of the pressures caused by "profit
3
squeeze" and new technological development in Europe.
George Goldie, a British entrepreneur succeeded in
amalgamating firms and eliminating rivals in order to
create the United Africa Company in 1879. By 1884, Goldie
4
had completely monopolized the delta trade. Goldie's
company received a royal charter and proclaimed a
protectorate over much of the Niger delta.
Jaja, a former Brass slave who created his own state
in Opobo, made attempts to organize palm oil shipment
directly to Europe, in coalition with some of the Royal
Niger Company's rival. Jaja was accused of treachery and
was deported in 1887. The company made arrangement that
warranted its penetration within the Sokoto caliphate. And
the French agreed to accept a demarcation line which
5
granted Northern Nigeria to Britain.
Commercial interest was a determinant factor in
establishing a viable economic hinterland for the British
coastal port of Lagos. To achieve this urge, Britain
engaged in a coastal race for the Niger in order to push
3
Arrival of steamboat caused new firms to penetrate
into delta area. They bought cargo space and this in turn




There were over-lapping of boundaries with the
French presence in areas surrounding Nigeria. Dahomey and
Niger for instance.
22
back the French and preserve most of the Yoruba states as
a British sphere of influence. War imminently resulted as
the Lagos regime provoked the most commercially effective
Yoruba middlemen state Ijebu. These men's power were
crushed though. Thus, the British were able to secure as
6
a colony, the most populous area of West Africa, Nigeria.
Sierra Leone was like Liberia, a settlement for
7
free slaves. Britain administered the territory as a
protectrate after 1896. The English language was imposed as
the Lingua Franca. The Anglo-phone colonies were Ghana,
Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
French Occupation:
In 1876, Colonel Pierre de L'Isle arrived in Senegal
as governor of the French colony. This marked a radical new
advance movement where French commerce predominated. The
French gradually developed a policy of transport and
communication deployment. They constructed a railway from
8
St. Louis to the new port of Daker through Cayor. A
Telegraph line was constructed too, to Futa Toro, in the
6
Baba Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment
in Nigeria. (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 31.
7
Liberia was established by America at the end of
slavery. Later it was accorded a Republic and remained so.
8
This railway network was vital in order to expedite
the production and export of groundnuts.
23
interior valley of the Senegal and Upper Niger.9 The French
hence, moved into the interior following the great trade
routes along which slave caravans had once trodden.
African rulers were perceived by Brier, as setbacks
to the extension of a commercially viable French empire.
These rulers imposed taxes and they hindered the
realization of a great potential surplus production from
the peasants and their rule stood in the way of the
establishment of necessary transport network. For
instance, Lat Dyor, who was Darnel of Cayor, opposed
construction of this rail network and harrassed the French
forces with guerrila warfare that represented a major phase
10
of wars of conquest of Senegal in 1880s. This extended
French expansion into the interiors.
In 1883, the French military began to annex Bamako
on the Niger. They proceeded to launch major attack on
Tukulor Empire founded by Al haji Umar. This area in
question covers the western half of contemporary Mali.
This successive attempt gave rise to French expansion into
Chad, linking the Sahara with French Algeria.
The French conquered most of the territory of West
Africa. They established control over the interior of the
9
A. J. Christopher, Colonial Africa,(London: Croom




Savanna, the Sahara and three new coastal colonies:
Guinea, Ivory Coast and Dahomey (Republic of Benin).
Decolonization of West Africa British:
After the second World War, pressure for self
government began to mount. The Ghanaian example set
precedence. The Convention People's Party (CPP) was formed
in 1949. The year 1950 marked the climax of militancy
against the colonial regime. The CPP was an ideal pressure
point. Nkrumah, the leader of this party, and his closest
associates paid the price for this militancy, even though
they did not instigate any riot nor strike. The British
used them as scape-goats.
In 1951, a new constitution proposed direct
elections for the entire territory and ministerial
responsibility was given to the successful party. The
CPP gained substantial seats and Nkrumah agreed to call
off Positive Action and serve as the Leader of Government
11
Business.
In 1954, Nkrumah won a second electorial victory.
But hostility against him increased even spreading to cocoa
growing region of Asante. By 1956, Britain obliged him to
call a final election, before proceeding to grant




weakening the CPP in Asante, but their alliance on a
national scale was remote. It could not offer a viable
strategy to unseat the CPP. Consequently, the CPP won the
1956 election and Nkrumah led the Gold Coast to
12
independence, as the new state of Ghana in 1957.
The absence of overt challenges to the interest of
Western security or business interests, was one of the most
significant aspect of Ghana's experience in the transition
13
years. The commodity boom was still in its apogee and
this generated optimism that the economic outlays were
strong enough to withstand political readjustment.
Decolonization in Nigeria displayed a similar
pattern to that of Ghana. The labor movement exercised
dissatisfaction and there was intensive politicization,
despite British measures to impose a business union
14
system.
The first major post-war political party, the
National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC), bore
a strong simlarity to the CPP. Its leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe,
was a journalist who, like Nkrumah, had receieved much of
12
For more information on this struggle see Richard
Bissel and Micheal Radu, eds., Africa in the Post






his education in U.S.A. Azikiwe was an Ibo from Eastern
Nigeria. The NCNC was never wholly Igbo in composition,
but it evoked hostility from others who used ethnic
solidarity as a vehicle of political and economic
competition.
Azikiwe inherited the banner of the more populist
stand of pre-war Lagos politics by establishing ties with
the labor movement, which shunned off popular agitation (at
least initially).
In the west, most of the Yoruba elites rejected the
NCNC and established the rival Action Group whose leader,
Obafemi Awolowo, called for decolonization towards a rather
weak federal Nigeria. Other Yoruba personalities continued
to function within the NCNC. As a result, control of the
15
west was hotly contested throughout the 1950s.
Two major parties developed in the north, the
Northern Peoples Congress and the Northern Elements
Progressive Union. The NPC was monopolized by the strong
men of the emirates. Ahmadu Bello headed the most radical
party, NEPU. In 1959 NPC finally agreed to independence
based on a strongly federal constitution. The coalition
between the NCNC and NPC was the first government formed in




premier was Tafawa Belewa. And Nigeria formed economic
and military alliance with Britain.
The peasant revolts in the mid 1950s in Sierra Leone
16
were the most dramatic social conflicts. They were aimed
at the authoritarian and "venal chiefs." These eventually
reasserted themselves under the patronage of Sierra Leone's
People's Party led by Milton Margai. In 1956, the first
colony-wide election was held. And Margai's diplomacy
brought Sierra Leone to independence, while his opponent
Siaka Stevens lost in 1961. By early 1960 Britain made up
its mind to give up its administrative position in Africa.
Consequently, Gambia received its independence in 1965.
The French Decolonization
Demand for full independence outside the French
colonial practice of assimilation was regarded as treason.
Therefore necessary action would be taken to restore
control. Cameroon's (that is the UPC) demand for
independence was totally unacceptable.
Senghor and the Ivory Coast unlike other French West
African colonies entertained viable mass parties. Leopold
Senghor founded the Bloc Democratique Senegalais, upstaged
the older generation of politicians from the four
16
Bill Freund, p. 223
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communities through alliances with the Shaykhs of the
17
islamic orders. By August of 1960, Senghor led his
country to independence.
A more radical upheaval occurred in the Ivory Coast.
The League of Africans who represented the most
progressive wing of the new politicians in French speaking
Africa, the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine,
established an effective branch, the Parti Democratique du
Cote d'lvoire. The PDCI won adherence of a significant
group of prosperous, labor employing cocoa planters.
Felix Houphet - Boigny, the leader of PDCI became the
Ivorian president when independence was granted on
August 6, 1960.
Sekou Toure, the leader of Parti Democratique du
Guinee (PDG) the Guinean section of RDA, came fronr the
trade union movement. These are ranks of manual workers.
The PDG struggle was anti-old aristocracy of the
impoverished Futa Djallon. This party like others demanded
self-rule. Sekou Toure was not prepared to accept the
humiliating demand of rejecting independence option.





1958. By 1960, Charles De Gaulle in a reversal of
policy, announced plans to grant independence to its
African colonies. French decolonization, was not a genuine
retreat from Africa, compared to its British equivalent.
It was instead a change of sovereignty that did not affect
the basic French interest. On achieving independence the
new nations signed agreements with France on foreign aid and
defence pact that reinforced French cultural and economic
predominance. Adding to these, France would leave its army
as a guarantor of the new regime. Africanization of the
state services was a slower process and less offensive than
in former British Africa.
18
De Gaulle ordered withdrawal not only of French
authority but technical personnel and moveable
infrastructure because of Toure's initiative.
30
Table 2.1
West African States - Independence
West African Country Colonial Power Year Of Independence
Benin Republic French August 1, 1960
Burkino Faso French August 5, 1960
Cameroon French April 10, 1960
Chad French August 10, 1960
Gambia Britain Februry 8, 1965
Ghana Britain March 6, 1957
Guinea French October 2, 1958
Ivory Coast French August 7, 1960
Niger French August 2, 1960
Nigeria Britain October 1, 1960
Senegal French August 20, 1960
Sierra Leone Britain April 27, 1961
Togo French April 27, 1960
Source: The Europa World Book, 1986.
The Consequence of Colonial Rule
By the 1960s, the majority of the West African
nations had managed to gain permission for their self-rule.
But the colonial foot print would never be wiped out of the
West African soil.
One of the consequences of European partition was
that where the contemporary national boundaries were drawn
did not take into consideration the political and socio-
economic interests and preferences of these West African
communities. Single sedentary communities have been forced
to belong to two different countries and there has been
31
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merging of very different cultural groups into one country.
For example, the Nigerian - Benin (Dahomey) boundary placed
one part of the Yorubas in Nigeria and the other in Benin.
The Ewes of Togo have many of their people on the other
side of the border in Ghana; the Hausas found themselves
in Nigeria, Niger Republic and Benin.
Nigeria embraces over five large ethnic groups, the
Hausas, Fulanis, Ibos, Yorubas, Efik-ibibio, and the
Kanuris. Each of these could have made up its own
political entity but instead became a part of the Nigerian
territory that has over 250 different languages.2u
The amalgamation of disparate ethnic groups into one
politico-economic entity created a lot of problems after
independence of West African countries. It was not easy to
maintain political stability in areas as Nigeria, Benin,
Togo, Ghana and Sierra Leone. This also created economic
disarticulation in that political discord always impeded
economic progress in these states.
Another strong politico-economic effect of colonial
legacy was the division of the region into two major
linguistic monetary blocs, the Francophone established the
19
J. 0. C. Onyemelukwe, Industrialization in





franc zone, and the Anglophone the sterling zone. This
linkage continued to the extent that twenty years after
political independence, most of these countries are
culturally and economically coupled to their former colonial
"masters." Geographical contiguity was a major
facilitator for the strong and direct political- economic
coupling of Francophonic West Africa. The contiguity
minimized physical distances, encouraged, transportation and
communication link-ups of various territories, and eased
commodity flow.
France's main interest in West Africa, like that of
Britain, was exploitation of natural resources. The French
corporate multinationals notably SCOA and CFAO were granted
extensive trade monopolies over these natural resources.
The Commuaute Franciere Africaine (CFA) lirtked all
former French colonies currencies with French franc at a
fixed exchange rate. These countries agreed to hold their
reserves mainly in French francs. French assistance is
received in the form of foreign aid like technical
assistance, budget support, plus subsidies on commodity
exports. What I am saying here is that, the political
dimension of France's influence is not fully appreciated up
21
German influence did not last. Britain and
France shared Togoland. Portuguese influence was limited to
Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde Islands.
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till now. For after independence most Franco-phonic states
in West Africa still coordinate foreign policy initiatives
and strategies with Paris. The European power still
influences West African countries at large. That is why
most scholars would prefer to state that West African




The U.S. national interest in a strong, sound,
healthy relationship with Africa was underscored by
Secretary Shultz's visit to six countries across west,
central and east Africa in January 1987. Home to nearly
half a billion people, Africa is an important part of the
world community.
According to Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs:
Africa's size and population makes it potentially
one of the most important commercial and economic
markets in the world. Africa is proximate to
crucial shipping lanes between Europe, Middle East,
South Asia and and the Far East. This guarantees a
role in the access to and security of the northwest
Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic Ocean. Africa
contains the vast majority of this planets
undiscovered mineral resources; it is virtually
impossible to dig a hole anywhere on the continent
without uncovering some marketable ore or other
mineral commodity. Its current production of
minerals is an important concern to U.S. industry
and commerce .^
1
Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of
Representative, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal
Years 1988-1989 Part 6: Hearing and Make-up Before the
Subcommittee on Africa. 100th Congress, 1st Session
March 4-19 1987, p. 8.
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Mr. Crocker further asserts that Africa is currently the
only economically affordable source of many strategic
minerals such as cobalt, chromium and the platinum group
metals. He adds that Africa has vast unexploited and
uncontemplated agricultural potential. And it's nearly 50
countries comprise almost one-third of the members of the
United Nations, the most cohesive voting bloc in that
forum. Africa is important to the U.S. in cultural and
historical terms.
According to the Assistant Secretary of State nearly
one American in eight, traces his or her ancestry back to
Africa. African countries' struggle for independence took
place at the time the U.S. was engaged in their civil
rights movement in the 1960s. The U.S. has a strong
humanitarian and national interest in helping Africa meet
the basic human needs of its people and realize its full
potential as a member of the democratic family of nations.
So what does the U.S. seek is its relationship with Africa?
Mr. Crocker responds that the U.S. seeks a vital healthy
relationship with a continent which shares many of their
fundamental values. For instance the U.S. commitment to
human rights, the desire to defeat terrorism and prevent
international aggression (containment of Quaddafi and the
36
2
removal from Africa of nearly 43,000 Cuban troops). The
U.S. also needs Africa to enhance its national security
needs for access and prepositioning of supplies to enable
it to execute its southwest Asia strategy.
For this reason the Reagan administration seeks
security assistance funding for Fiscal Year 1988: $98.0
million in Military Assistance Program (MAP), $5.0 million
in FMS concession credit (Foreign Military Sales), $10.5
million in International Military Education and Training
3
(IMET) and $100.0 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF).
With these in mind, let us look back into the trend of
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa with special
emphasis in West Africa.
U.S. Energy Policy
A study published in 1983 on the economic and
political implications of sudden oil wealth in a range of
West African countries makes the basic point that Africa is
4





Major David C. Underwood. West African Oil: Will
it Make a Difference?" Major Underwood's country-by-
country study published in full under the aegis of the CSIS
African Study Program in 1983. Meanwhile this is drawn
from his Master's of Art thesis in National Security
Affairs from the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey,
California (December 1982).
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African countries have significantly proven reserves:
Nigeria with 16.5 billion barrels was on the top list,
followed by the Ivory Coast and Ghana. Exploration efforts
underway in the region have indicated that by 1990, Benin
and Equatorial Guinea could be producing between 15 and 360
thousand barrels a day. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development estimates that Africa's
continental and off-shore petroleum reserves in the next 20
years are approximately 51.3 billion barrels, or 14 percent
5
of total world discoveries. Other parts of Africa such as
Angola in Southern Africa and Congo, Cameroon and Gabon in
Central Africa, also account for the huge oil reserve.
The security of energy supplies has been a major
factor in U.S. defense policy in recent years. This
received heightened attention by President Carter in
6
January 1980, and the succeeding Reagan Administration.
Nearly 40 percent of the total oil utilized in the
industrial western economy today, comes from the volatile
Persian Gulf area which is subject to interruption through





U.S. Policy and the Third World; Policy Research
Project Report, vol 47. University of Texas at Austin,
Lyndon Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1982, p. 8.
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Nigeria is the second largest oil exporter to the U.S.
following Saudi Arabia. Due to instability in the Persian
Gulf, West African oil producing states may become vital to
U.S. security needs.
Food For Peace Program
Food in many respects, remains at the core of
international development issues. It is also an area in
which the U.S. has an opportunity to make a particularly
significant and positive contribution. The United States
is the largest producer of food exports, supplying about 45
percent of total exports of wheat and 64 percent of coarse
7
grains in the 1978-1979 periods.
When John Block was nominated by President Reagan's
choice as Secretary of Agriculture, he advocated a-policy
that links countries to the U.S. through their dependence
on American food. He argued that such a dependence would
make these countries more reluctant to oppose U.S. foreign
8
policy efforts in the global system.
Historically, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) has
comprised about one third of U.S. bilateral development
7John W. Sewell and John A. Mathieson, "North-
South Relations" in Setting National Priorities-Aqenda-for
the 1980s, Joseph A. Pechman. ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institute, 1980), pp. 497-530.
8
New York Times. December 24, 1980, p. 1.
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assistance. Title I of Public Law 480 provides for
concessional sale of agricultural commodities to "friendly"
countries. In order to get the assistantship, a country
would approach the U.S. government to negotiate an agreement,
Public Law 480 grains must of course come from the U.S.
vessel. Title II authorizes donation of food on behalf of
the people of the United States to meet famine or urgent
9
relief or nutritional need.
Approximately $1 billion was allocated for food for
peace credits in fiscal year 1981-1982. Former Secretary
of State, Alexander Haig, in a presentation to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the fiscal year 1982 foreign
assistance program said:
in our budget submission to Congress, a $1.9 billion
Agency for International Development program is
required. Over 50 percent will be used to alleviate
malnutrition and hunger."10
With huge quantity of shipments to Egypt, the Public law
480 program is something of a reward for cooperative
policies. At the same time, there is no denial of the
genuine need of Egypt. In 1975, Egypt imported $104.5
million of food plus donations of $12.8 million for the U.S.
9
U.S. Policy and Third World, p. 29.
10
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations. Statement by Secretary of State Alexander Haia
97th Congress, 1st Sess, March 1981.
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government. In 1982, the sales were $262 million while
donations were $31.9 million. In 1983, Egypt received
$16.8 million in donations and $238.3 million from sales.
Morocco, Sudan and Somalia - all in Northern Africa,
also purchased and as well received donations from the U.S.
In East Africa, Kenya and Zaire from 1975 to 1983
received $139.7 million under Public Law 480 (See Table
3.1). Ghana was the only West African country, recorded to
have received $70.5 million U.S. sales and donation of
this grant between 1975 and 1983.
In 1983-1984, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan
received a total of $681.3 millions under food sales and
11
$239.7 from donations.
Commitment for Economic Assistance
President Harry Truman's 1947 statement is worth
recalling:
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured
by misery and want. They spread and grow in the
evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their
full growth when hope of a people- for better life
has died.12
11
U.S. Bureau of Census: Statistical Abstract of
1986 and 1987, vol.106 and 107.
12
"Recommendation on Greece and Turkey," message of
the President to the 80th Congress, 1st Session, March 12,
1947, U. S. Department of State Bulletin. Supplement,
May 14, 1947, p. 832.
41
Table 3.1
U. S. Sales and Donations Under Food for Peace
(Public Law 480) Programs)
1975 to 1983
1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Country Sales tions Sales Jons Sales tions Sales tions Sales tions Sales tions
Ghana - 2.8 9.5 5.1 12.1 3.9 12.1 6.9 7.0
6.3 - 5.1
Egypt 104.5 12.8 230.7 22 4 285 3 16 1 272 ^
S: : lU 1O\:77 l\\\ ^ 2(i «•'; ijij mIo i5:J 2l^.l Hi
Sudan - 8.2 19.0 1.8 25!o l'.l 3o!o a'.9 2s!o \'.l ll'.l t'.l
Kenya ' " " 1.2 16.1 3.2 15.0 10.4 14.3 3.1 14.3 2.6
Zaire " -4 17-° 4-* 15.7 .6 10.0 3.5 10.0 - 10.0 .9
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract 1985, 105th edition, p. 657.
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Foreign aid appropriations have often received low priority
treatment by U.S. Congress. For fiscal years 1980 and
1981, Congress failed to enact foreign aid appropriation
bills. Secretary Haig lamented that "this has caused us
substantial difficulties. We have been forced to neglect
vital aspects of our assistance programs, U.S. foreign
i- 13
policy interests have been undermined." Chairman Charles
Percy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out
that the foreign assistance portion of the federal budget
had declined from around 7 percent during the Eisenhower
years to about 1.4 percent proposed under President
14
Reagan.
Starting with the post World War II Marshall Plan,
the United States set the pattern and pace for foreign aid
programs. The Marshall Plan focused primarily on "Europe in
order to facilitate the reconstruction of the war-torn
Europe. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 marked the
beginning of an economic aid program which in essence, has
continued up to the present time. The budget category now
known as the Economic Support Fund (ESF) began as
"Economic Support for Defense" in the act. The program has
13
U.S. Policy and Third World, p. 41.
14
U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Charles Percy,
introducing the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1981, 97th Congress, 1st Session April
9/ 1981. Congressional Record. 127: 3818.
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been called Defense Supporting Assistance or Security
Assistance Act. The Economic Support Fund was authorized
by the 1978 International Security Assistance Act. The ESF
is supposed to be used only for economic assistance, rather
than the broader military-related purposes of the earlier
program. The 1978 amendments were intended to make ESF
more clearly economic aid rather than previous combination
15
of economic and military aid.
In the early 1960s the number of independent nations
in the world significantly increased, and these nations were
concerned with the quest for the economic and social
progress. The U.S.S.R. was beginning to compete with the
U.S. as an aid donor, especially in Egypt and India.
This caused a shift in the rules of the game. Nations that
had once allied with U.S. as a precondition of aid now had
a choice and even enjoyed the luxury of playing one donor
off against the other, without making political commitment.
As a result of this U.S. - U.S.S.R. competition, aid became
a tool with which to bid for favor of nations not yet
16
committed. Therefore, aid became less effective as a
method for the U.S. to achieve immediate foreign policy
objectives.
15
U.S. Policy and Third World, p. 42.
16Ibid.
44.
U.S. aid policies were then designed to provide
economic growth and political stability to the emergent
Third World nations while integrating them into a
17
democratic and free - enterprise oriented world order.
This transformation of one element of U.S. aid from a
political instrument of the cold war to a development
program was problematic.
One of the major impacts of this new development aid
was diffusion of aid to a wide range of LDCs which resulted
in the problem of formulating criteria to allocate aid to
particular countries. This, in turn, meant that the
management of aid policy became even more complex. The
current relationship between the Third World and the U. S.
is considerably different than when the U.S. aid program
began. For instance, the Third World demands for a new
international economic order and the efforts of Group of 77
to advocate the Third World view created a more complex
international environment. Also, Congress has sharply
criticized the aid program. This skepticism has included
the confusion over the political impact of aid and the
ambiguity of the state of economic development, in the Third
World. The main reason for the congressional reluctance to
17
David F. Gordon "United States Foreign Aid in
Perspective," Current History 77 no. 448 (July - August
1979): p.3.
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support foreign aid has been the "over-selling of aid by
successive administrations as a means of assuring desired
18
behavior by client government."
A study by the Center of International Studies at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1957,
established the intellectual foundations that served as the
rationale for U.S. development asssistance and is still in
19
use today.
The report argued that:
A policy of deterrence against the Soviet military
threat is not of itself adequate to achieve the
kind of world environment favorable to the U.S.
. . . containment requires more than a sustained
demonstration that the Western allies can and will
prevent a Soviet take-over of border areas. A
sustained program of U.S. economic assistance
could help less developed countries create the
conditions for self-sustaining economic growth
and this would materially reduce the danger
of future conflict by aggressive minor powers.
The use of economic support funds and security supporting
assistance in recent years has been directed toward a few
countries of extreme importance to the United States,
especially Israel in the Middle East and Egypt in Africa.
According to a Library of Congress Congressional Research
18
Charles Williams Maynes and Richard H. Ullman,
"Ten Years of Foreign Policy" Foreign Policy 40, (Fall
1980): p. 7.
19
The MIT report known as Milliken-Rostow Report was
written by a team headed by Max F. Milliken. Other members
were Walt W. Rostow, Charles Kindleberger, Everett E. Hagan
and Lucian Pye.
46
Service Study, the actual impact of U.S. aid on the
overall host country economy is low. This is clearly the
case with the many small programmes that the U.S. has
operated in Africa.
The U.S. government foreign grants and credits to
Africa, from 1945-1985, totaled $17,091 million. The
grant to Northern African countries amounted to $7,349
million. Algeria, $743 million; Ethiopia, $807 million;
Mali, $263 million; Mauritania $182 million; Morocco,
$1,837 million; Somalia, $670 million; Sudan, $1,496
million; and Tunisia, $1,347 million (see Table 3.2).
The Central African region received a total of
20
$3,552 million in the same period. Cameroon, $216
million; Kenya, $658 million; Tanzania, $418 million;
Togo, $87 million; Uganda, $85 million; Zaire, $1,538 and
Zambia $375.
The Western African subregion was allocated the sum
of $3,583 million. The Republic of Benin accounted for $63
million; Burkino Faso, $331; Chad, $168; Cape Verde, $69;
Ghana, $419; Guinea, $200; Ivory Coast, $128; Liberia,
20
For convenience, I included the countries of the
Horn into Central and Northern Africa, as could be easily
seen on the African Map. Burundi was granted $71 million
and Rwanda $104 million.
21





















































































































































































































































































































1.125 71 75 343 391
Total 17,091 148 2272 3610 4850




















































































Source: U. S. Bureau of Census: Statistical Abstract 1987, 107 ed
p. 785.
1
July 1, 1945, through Dec 31, 1985.
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$707; Niger, $272; Nigeria, $638; Senegal, $425; and Sierra
Leone, $144.
Southern African region received a total of $1,432
million excluding South African Republic. Angola's
allocation totaled $121; Boswana, $204; Lesotho, $224;
Madagascar, $107; Malawi, $92; Mozambique, $172; Swaziland,
$66; and Zimbabwe, $271. (See Table 3.3).
U.S. Security Interest: An Exploration
In nearly four decades, since WWII, there has been
little basic change in the U.S. military view of Africa as
an appendage of U.S. security interests in Europe, Middle
East, and Asia. Helen Kitchen contends that the
intervention in Congo in the early 1960s and in
Angola in the mid 1970s, was as well as the post-shah
priority being to cultivating "proven friends" along the
continents northern and eastern perimeters, fall into this
22
contextual framework.
The origin of the current U.S. security
assistance program are generally traced to the Greek—
Turkish aid program launch by President Truman in 1947.
Later, a substantial portion of U. S. security efforts was
directed at Asia—first in Taiwan, next South Korea, and
then Southeast Asia. The main focus was on support for
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1987, 107 ed. p. 785
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of either invasion or subversion by communist forces, and
on support for regimes seen as key elements in a strategy
23
of containment. During the 1950s, 80 percent of military
assistance grants to the Third World went to Asia, and 63
percent was provided to Taiwan, Indochina, and Korea.
Grant military assistance as a major element of U.S.
aid gradually declined in the late sixties and seventies,
with the foreign military sales (FMS) program becoming
increasingly important. Domestic budget constraints and
discontent with the result of some of the U.S. military
relationships and involvement in Vietnam and elsewhere
contributed to a changing view of security assistance.
Congress became increasingly opposed to the grants military
assistance program (MAP) and favored a total phase-out of
the program. However, Congress has recently shown some
willingness to continue MAP on a small scale. The*
relatively small International Military Education and
Training (IMET) has continued as a program.
Since the beginning of the IMET program in 1950,
over 500,000 personnel from 85 countries have participated
24
in the training. A number of these trainees are now
23
"Soviet Policy and the United States Responses
in the Third World" report prepared for the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. 97th
Cong. 1st Session; by the Congressional Research Service,




highly placed in their governments and armed forces.
During the late 1970s, there was controversy over several
IMET programs with regards to Latin American countries.
Hence, Congress imposed restrictions on IMET grants because
of human rights considerations. The IMET program provides
valuable training for its participants and gives foreign
military officials exposure to American institutions and
ideals.
The Economic Support Fund is an important
instrument of U.S. security policy and constitutes a major
portion of U.S. assistance to the Third World. Egypt has
25
been by far, the largest recipient of the ESF funds.
Others are Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Sudan and
Tunisia are being given a higher security assistance
priority in order to help them "withstand pressure- from
Libya." Secretary Haig calls this vital to their largest
interest. He asserts that:
As the threat to these important states mounts, so
too, indirectly does the pressure on Egypt, with all





U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Statement by Secretary Alexander Haig, Jr.,
"Security and Development Assistance," before the Senate
Foreign Committee March 19, 1981, 97th Congress, 1st
Session, Current Policy World. 264, 1981, p. 3.
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Arms sales have become an increasingly important
instrument of overall U.S. foreign policy. Third World
countries have become major customers in the international
arms marketing, purchasing arms, usually on very favorable
terms, from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and other
nations.
There are conflicting data in various tallies of
international weapon sales, but most tabulations indicate
that the United States is the top arms exporter, with the
27
Soviet Union ranking second. According to an analysis of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarment Agency (ACDA), the
Soviet Union exceeded the U.S. in arms export for 1978,
ACDA reports that the U.S. exported $22.4 billion in arms
28
to developing nations, and the U.S.S.R. $20.8 billion.
Figures compiled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
however, indicated that the combined total of weapons export
of the U. S. and other Western nations have far exceeded
those of the U.S.S.R. and other communist nations in
most years. Furthermore, the Foreign Relations Committee
reports that except for 1978, when Soviet sales were down
considerably, the U.S.S.R. has trailed only slightly
27
U.S. Arms Control and Disarment Agency,
Military Expenditure and Arms. Transfers 1969-78.




behind the U. S. in arms sales in the Third World. For
1979, the U.S. sold $10 million and the U.S.S.R. $9.8
29
billion to the Third World.
Of the $90 billion in arms sales to Third World
countries from 1974 to 1977, the U.S. accounted for about
43 percent, the U.S.S.R. 32 percent, and Western Europe
more than 20 percent.3^ The fact that some arms transfers
are treated as classified information plus differences in
accounting procedures contributes to the questionable
accuracy of some figures.
President Carter, early in his administration,
noting that the U.S. accounted for more than one-half of
the total world arms sales, outlined a new arms sales
policy. He stated that:
U.S. would begin to view arms transfers as an ~
exceptional foreign policy instrument, to be used
only in instances where it can be clearly
demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our
national security...The U. S. shall also assess the
economic impact of arms transfers to those less
29
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Sales Policy.
Committee Print. June 1980.
30
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relation, Prospects for Multilateral Arms Exports
Restraints, Staff Report Committee Print, April 1979, p. 1
- 5. Micheal Gordon "Competition with Soviet Drives Reagan
Arms Sales Policy," National Journal (May 16, 1981):
p. 873.
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developed countries receiving U.S. economic
assistance.J1
Some critics have charged that the actual policy was
inconsistant with the rhetoric, while others argued that
the policy was over-restrictive. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's June 1980 report concluded, that the
Carter policy did not lead to arms sales becoming an
exceptional foreign policy instrument. The community
recommended that. . ."U.S. should set a middle course. . .
32
and the potential results should not be oversold.
The Reagan administration disavowed the Carter
policy. Under Secretary Buckley condemned Carter's policy.
He called for a new approach that will be based on the
assumption that the strengthening of friendly nations is
"an essential component of our total effort to restore
effective deterrence to aggression. . . . Arms transfer




U.S., President. Public Papers of the Presidents
of the U.S.r Jimmy Carter Book 1. "Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy, May 19, 1977, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office 1977, p. 321-22.
Senate Foreign Relation Committee, Arms Transfer.
o 4 •
33 under Secretary of State James L. Buckley, "Arms
Transfer and the National Interest," paper presented to the
B^rd of Governors of the Aerospace Industries Association,
Williamsburg, Virginia, May 21, 1981.
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The Reagan foreign military sales financing programs
is used to help countries, primarily in the Third World,
acquire U.S. defense materiel and services. A substantial
portion of these credits go to Egypt. Egypt is also the
major recipient of U.S. weapons in Africa while Libya,
Algeria and Ethiopia are listed as primary recipients of
Soviet weapons. From 1962 to 1983 the following countries
received $5,840 million of U.S. foreign military aid:
Ethiopia, $224; Morocco, $475; Sudan, $211; Tunisia, $381;
and Egypt $4,282. Kenya and Zaire were the only central
African countries recorded to have received the sum of $171
34
and $185 respectively, in the same period. (See Table 3.4)
Between 1982-1985 the northern African countries
to received military aid from U.S. numbered five; Morocco,
$252 million; Somalia, $12; Sudan, $238; Tunisia, $377, and
Djibouti, $7. In sum, this region received a total of $997
million. (See Table 3.5)
In the same period, Niger and Liberia were the two
countries listed to have received $64 million while Niger
Republic received $12 million.
Botswana was recorded as the only Southern African
nation to have received $24 million of U.S. foreign
34




U.S. Military Sales Deliveries and Military Assistance
Deliveries to African States 1950-1985
Country Military Sales Deliveries Military Assistance Deliveries
1950- 1982 1983 1984 1985 1950- 1982 1983 1984 1985
1980 1980
Egypt 657.5 973.3 1083.5 321.8 619.8
Ethiopia 86.6 - - - - 182.9
Libya 29.6- - - - 1.26 -
Kenya 88.0 23.5 19.9 6.0 8.3 - -
Zaire 65.6 6.5 6.7 4.8 11.4 23.3 - (Z)
Liberia 4.3 .1 9.3 7.3 10.2 5.8 (Z) .4
Nigeria 39.1 7.7 2.5 3.8 1.6 - - -
Total 43.4 7.8 11.8 45.3 21.8 5.8
1
-Represents zero, (Z) less than $50,000, includes military
Construction sales deliveries includes transactions for
transition quarter July - September 1976.
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census: Statistical Abstract 1987, p. 324.
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Table 3.5
Value of Arms Transfers Cummulative 1981 - 1985, by Major

























































































South Africa 0 20
Zimbawe 5 0
3,470 20
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarment Agency.
World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1986.
Washington, D. C, April 1987.
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military aid, in that region. It was indicated that
certain military aid and sales were classified
information. If this is the case, no wonder Botswana is
the only Southern African state listed to have received
this assistance in this crisis area.
Central African sub-region accounted for $161 million
of the total U.S. military aid to Africa in the above
mentioned period. Cameroon was allocated $15 million.
35
Gabon, $8; Kenya, $101 million and Zaire $37 million.
It must be made clear that African countries import
arms from other suppliers such as France, United Kingdom,
Federal Republic of Germany, China, Italy, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Romania and other countries. These
countries export significant proportions of arms to Africa
while Russia and America remain the major suppliers. As a
matter of fact, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Zimbawe to mention a
few, import more arms from other nations than from U.S. and
36
U.S.S.R.
But arms trade or transfer is considered one of the
strategic policy options by policymakers. The very




U.S. Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1986. (Washington,
D.C. April 1987) p. 143-5.
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situation. Concurring with U.S. Under Secretary for
Defense, Buckley stated that "nothing worthwhile in the
world community is possible—neither economic growth nor
political or social reform—in an atmosphere of increasing
37
instability." Therefore U.S. arm transfers (sales and
aid) is perceived as policy instrument in the superpowers
unfolding contest for influence in Africa. This position
is further elaborated in subsequent section of this
manuscript.
Trade Issues
The Trade Agreement Act of 1934 marked the beginning
of a liberal foreign economic policy by the United States.
The act was based on classic economic theories of
international trade and tariff policy. The premise is that
free trade would promote more trade, and partners treated
equally would benefit all. Therefore, the reciprocal trade
agreements were designed not just with laissez-faire
philosophy in mind but as a response to the excessive
38
protectionism of the Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
Tariff restrictions imposed under the Act led to prompt
reciprocal tariffs by U.S. major trading partners. A








In the years to follow, many changes occurred in
the nature of world economic interaction. The Bretton
Woods System, based on gold convertibility, changed to a new
floating world monetary system. The relative economic
strengths of the industrialized nations changed. For 30
years economic growth was remarkable. The emergence of
developing nations as an economic force made for the call
for a new international economic order (NIEO).
Trade issues had been the core of the North - South
debate and have been a vital part of the South's call for
40
NIEO. There has been undeniable growth and progress in
world trade since that call and many developing nations
benefited.
The United States relies on Third World countries as
important markets for goods and services; as unique sources
of imports; and as a focus of profitable private
investments. In 1979, Third World nations bought U.S.
merchandise worth $63 billion, or about 35 percent of total
39
See Joan Spero for Post World War II Development
of the International Financial Institutions and the General
Agreements on Trade and Tariff.
40
United Nations, The United Nations Development
Decade; Proposal for Action; Report of the
Secretary General. E/3613 1962 p. vli": See Sidney
Weintraub ,"What Life is Left in the North South Diologue,"
World Economy 2, 4, (February 1980) p. 457.
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U.S. exports, including 40 percent U.S. exports of
manufactured goods. The Oil Producing and Exporting
countries (OPEC) accounted for $15 billion of the
purchases, non OPEC nation were responsible for $48
billion. Among the largest U.S. markets in the Third
World are Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, South Korea,
Brazil and Nigeria.
In 1979, the U.S. enjoyed $10.3 billion surplus on
its service with LDCs. And these countries were the source
of 34 percent of the earnings of U.S. private foreign
direct investment. In the first quarter of 1981, the
volume of U.S. exports increased by 7 percent, compared
with a 4 percent decline in the fourth quarter of 1980.
This reflected the stronger demand for U.S. exports in
Latin America, Asia, and Africa, which resulted in" an 11
percent increase in the volume of agricultural exports and
a 6 percent increase in the volume of non-agricultural
exports, according to the Department of Commerce. 42
41
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, U.S. Prosperity and the Developing Countries,"
June#1981. See also U.S. Congr. Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations "The U.S. Prosperity and the Developing
Countries" June 1981. See also U.S. Stake in the Global
Economy," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International
97th Cong., 1st Sess, Feb. 1981. " "
42
Department of Commerce, Press Release
Washington, D. C, May 6, 1981.
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The U.S.S.R. trade turnover with the Sub-Saharan
region was only 0.8 percent of its total turnover with the
outside world in 1978 and 1979. Soviet exports to the
region was 0.8 and 0.6 percent of all its export in the
same two years, while its import from there were 0.8 and
43
1.2 percent respectively.
In contrast, U.S. bilateral aid and trade over
shadowed Soviet's bounds. What is lacking in the U.S.
approach to aid and trade with Africa, is any evidence of a
conceptual long term U.S. commitments to Africa's trade
and development, a requirement that would allow the U.S. to
be viewed as a serious and reliable partner. One major
reason for this lack in long-term thrust is the
constitutional requirement for the executive branch,
annually to debate internally and then sell to Congress
both the concept of aid and a country-by-country "
justification for the year's package proposal, says Helen
Kitchen. She added that the principle that applies to
other areas of the world and other government programs also
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The U.S. export and import of commodities to
African countries from 1975 to 1985 remained very
significant. Northern African region (Algeria, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia)
imports in this period represented a total of $18,645
million worth of goods from these countries (see Table 3.6).
The Central African region (Cameroon, Gabon, Central
African Republic, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and
Zambia) imported $5,386 million goods from the U.S. The
U.S. general import from this area accounted for $7,717
million. The merchandise trade balance was minus $5,318
million.
Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria were the only Western
African countries to import from the U.S. The worth of
this import was $4,708 and the U.S. imported from them,
$25,973 millions. The trade deficit was $21,229 million.
Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique and South African
Republic (Southern African region) accounted for $10,153
million export from U.S. While the U.S. imported merchandise
that represented $15,431 millions. The trade balance, thus,
was minus $5,229 million dollars.
It is very true that most African nations depend on
foreign trade in terms of national income. Critical to
this issue is the composition of exports and imports.
Primary products, the traditional mainstay, remains the
67
Table 3.6






































































































































































































































































Repbl. 1302 2463 2129 2265 1205 840 3321 2027 2488 2071
Z less than $500,000 - represents zero
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census. Foreign Commerce and Navigation of
the United States; Highlights of U. S. Export and Import Trade,
FT990 monthly; and unpublished data.
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predominant export. This is the reason for the weak export
performance as opposed to U.S. which exports both
manufacturers and agricultural products. Therefore,
African nations are very vulnerable to price fluctuations
because the total value of export earnings depends not only
on the volume of exports sold abroad but also on the price
paid for them. If export prices go down, greater volumes
of exports will have to be sold to keep earnings constant.
Total foreign exchange depends on both quantity and price
of imports (see Table 3.7).
If the price of a country's export is falling
relative to the price of the products it imports, it will
have to sell much more of its exports and enlist more of
its scarce productive resources merely to secure the same
level of imported goods that it purchased in previous
years. Due to unequal exchange, in terms of price
differences between imported and exported goods, African
countries are running deficit in trade with the U.S. This





















































































































































THE U.S. PRAGMATIC NEO-REALISM AND WEST
AFRICA: A CONCLUSION
Realism and Neorealism:
Realism is a major paradigmatic tool in the analysis
of world politics. The United States as a rational actor
clearly adopts this framework of analysis in calculating
its policy objectives. Robert Keohane's Neorealism and
its Critics is the pivotal source in explicating this
rational actor model. For it documented a comprehensive
account of the realist-neorealist perspectives.
I favor this framework of analysis because of its
applicability to practical problems of international
relations. This theory purports a readily comprehensible
set of steps to be followed by U. S. policymakers in order
to reduce potential national security threats.
Robert Keohane contends that an analyst working
within the list tradition will proceed in the following
ways:
-focus on states that could constitute effective
threats, alone or in coalition with another,
given the power at their disposal
-interpret the actions of those states not on the
basis simply of their announced policies nor on
the assumption that they will behave morally, but
rather that they are seeking rationally to
increase their power.
-will devise policies that protect society by
amassing or maintaining sufficient power alone, or
in coalitions, to maintain essential security
interests. 1
Immediately after WW II, the realist school assumed
a dominant pattern in analyzing why nations act. Scholars
like John Herz, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippman, and Hans
J. Morganthau argued "political realism." They sought to
redirect United States foreign policy such that it could
respond to perceived Soviets aggression. Their theoretical
percepts embraced by U.S. decision-makers who had formerly
sought to "exercise isolationism, but then resorted to a
permanent and global involvement in world affairs, and
2
rational accumulation of power." Therefore, from. 1945
onward, foreign policy articulations were carried in the
language of "political realism". That is, the language of
power and interest rather than ideals or norms. Kennan and
Lippman favored this tendency because they were more
interested in practice than in abstract theory.
Morgenthau on assessing U.S. actions viewed realism
as an interpretative guide that would help people read,
~1
rHH Robert o.Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Tts
Cri^s' (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)
p • / — 8 •
2Ibid. p. 9.
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understand and anticipate statesmen (actors). He asserted
that international politics as a struggle for power could
be understood by assuming that statesmen think and act in
terms of interest defined by power. He regards power as an
end in itself, due to human nature.
Keohane, however, criticized Morganthau for failing
to differentiate between power as a resource and power as
3
an ability to influence other's behavior. He posits that
power is to be defined in terms of specific resources (e.g.
behavioral influences), as this was a testable theory.
Morgenthau also believes that when governments acts
rationally, they have consistent, ordered preferences and
they calculate the cost and benefit of all alternative
choices. This would help to maximize the utility of those
preferences. Morgenthau added that political realism
sought to instruct leaders in order to help them act more
rationally.
Morgenthau, according to Keohane was unable to
create a "consistent and convincing theory because his
4
definitions of balance of power and power were not coherent.
3
Power as a profile includes tangible and intangible
elements as described by Theodore Columbis and James Wolfe
Introduction to International Relations (New Jersey
Prentice Hall 1986), p. 95. ~'
4
See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
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Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffman and Richard
Rosecrance used "systemic theory" to account for states
behavior. Their main focus was on the competitive, anarchic
nature of world politics as a whole. They attempted to
explicate variations, that is, the alternations of war and
peace, stability and instability.
Kenneth Waltz agreed with the premise of these
writers. He believed that a good theory of international
politics must be systemic, for organization of interstate
transactions impacts government behaviors towards one
another. Kenneth Waltz defines system as "a set of
interacting units exhibiting behavioral regularities and
5
having an identity over time."
... in order to turn a system approach into a
theory, one has to move from the usual vague
identification of systemic forces and effect, to
their more precise specification, to say what units
the system comprises, to indicate the comparative
weights of systemic forces and to show how
forces and effects change from one system to
another, in order for theory to avoid the perils of
reductionism (relying for explanation on unit-level
rather than system-level attributes) or
tautology. °
Waltz therefore criticized Hoffman, Kaplan and
Roscerance for not having gone beyond the description of
international system to identify their structures, defined
5
Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics




separately from the attributes and relations between the
7
units.
He creates his own "positional picture" which he
says:
emerges if we abstract from every attribute of
states except their capabilities, the key changes
in international relations are the ones in the
distribution of capabilities across units.
'A good theory,' as Waltz puts it, 'will not
merely point to importance of power and the balance
of power as Morgenthau did, but will account for
the recurrent formation of balances of power in
world politics, tell us how changing power
configuration affect patterns of alignments and
conflict in world politics.'
Balances of power would emerge due to the
anarchic nature of International system adding to
the assumption that states "are unitary actors who
at a minimum seek their own preservation and at a
maximum, drive for universal domination."
As states compete with each other, they will
imitate each other and become socialized in their
system.8
Waltz applies his structural theory to issues of
economic interdependence, military relationships, and what
he calls the "management of international affairs." He
exaggerated the extent to which great powers, including
U.S. are dependent on others. He stated that:
-military power remains useful as ever—its
usefulness has appreciated and military bipolarty
is remarkably stable.
7




-the role of great powers is in maintaining
order. . .
-the problem is in predicting how possibily
the great powers would constructively manage
international affairs, as the system changes.9
Most theorists of world politics agree with Waltzian
analysis. Hence, he initiated a new line of theoretical
inquiry while trying to systematize political realism into a
rigorous, detective system theory of international
10
politics. The Waltzian synthesis is known as Neorealism.
The term neorealism is first used by Robert W. Cox from
his discussion of "Social Forces, States and World Orders:
11
Beyond International Relation Theory". Robert Keohane,
and Robert G. Gilpin among others, are classified as major
neo-realist scholars.
Waltz's contribution helps us think more clearly
about the role of systemic theory, the explanatory power of
structrural models, and how to account deductively for the
recurrent formation of balances of power. He shows that








The insights of Realism are very enduring. They
12
cross ideological lines. Contemporary realists like
Waltz systematized the basic assumptions of classical
Realism into what is called Structural Realism. Snyder and
Diesing have employed this framework when discussing game
theory, structure and bargaining. (Keohane, p. 175). And
Gilpin used classical argument of Thucydides to explore
problems of international change. The only difference (but
not major difference) is that neorealists seek to apply
social theory to understanding international affairs (p.
307).
For all these scholars, realism fruitfully focuses
attention on fundamental issues of power, interests and
rationality. And the majority of their views are adopted
by the U.S. policymakers.
Keohane declares that "realism makes us aware of the
odds against us."
"Realist" Analysis: U.S. in West Africa
I have stated above that there are three parameters
of realist tradition that influence U.S. policy options.
12
Keohane contends that the Marxian scholars in
discussing class struggle and uneven development
contended that power is crucial, that world system are
periodically dominated by hegemonic power wielding
economic and military resources. Lenin discussed the
influence of strength, and Wallerstein emphasises
hegemony and the role of military forces, p. 182.
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They are issues of power, interests and rationality. A
review of U.S.-West African policy depicts an absence
key issues. Why? The answer emerges from the way the
U.S. sets outs its objectives in other regions.
This issue of power is the foremost. One cannot
cogently discuss this without mentioning the East-West
Chessboard that extended itself into African territory.
America, in order to deter or counter hegemonic intrusions
by the Soviets or their surrogates into Africa, includes the
issue of geopolitics as one of its priorities.
The Soviets presence in Ethiopia (the Horn of
Africa) and Angola (in Southern Africa) clearly threatens
the U.S. interest. Therefore since 1980, the U.S. has
provided military help and 68 percent of the $568 million
total is concentrated in such countries as Sudan, Somalia
and Kenya. Seychelles and Djibouti have been included in
areas of vital interest.
The purpose of the U.S. military and security aid is
to apply American power internationally by:
(1) strengthening the defensive capabilities of the
states in the American alliance structure; (2)
helping friendly nations quell internal political
or military disturbances; and (3) assisting
friendly nations in buying breathing space and,
with luck, in regaining or retaining stability.
Security assistance may be used to buy friendship
from governments where this is a commodity for sale.
The North African countries (see Chapter III)
received valuable quantity of arms from the U.S. From
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1981-1985 the amount totalled $990 million. Three Central
African nations received $130 million (Table 3.5) excluding
the special $560 million that had been allocated to the
mentioned countries of vital strategic location. Four West
African nations received $210 million. The figures speak
for themselves. West Africa is not counted as area of
crucial geopolitical interest to America, even though Chad
currently receives Washington's attention because of
Quaddafi's adventure in that country. Quaddafi was
regarded as a Soviet satellite and his expansion attempts
are perceived with contempt. Therefore, America and France
try to counter Libyan threats by sending military aid to
Chad.
The premise underlying security assistance is the
extension of U.S. power in the world and realist scholars
and neorealists, will perceive this as legitimate. The
Soviet's established presence in these African regions
threatens the American influence. Therefore, it is
rational and in the interest of the U.S. to extend its
global influence to the Horn, North Africa, Central Africa
and Southern Africa.
Another parameter of the U.S. geopolitical interest
is to cement special relationships with governments willing
to provide access to ports and other facilities supportive
of a global U.S. military outreach. The Horn and area down
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to the coastal regions of Kenya, Tanzania to South Africa
are very vital to the U.S. Military machine re-fueling.
This area is also relevant in terms of strategic interests
to the shipping lanes from the Middle-East, the security of
the Indian Ocean and transit across the South Atlantic. The
North African region, the Horn and Southern Africa are also
close to the critically important southern flank of Europe
and the vulnerable oil producing areas of Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf. Therefore, it is in the vital national interest
of the United States to map out a favorable policy option
in these regions. The U.S. in this regard uses the
instrument of "foreign aid" as an incentive.
The U.S. foreign aid committed for economic
assistance from 1982-1985 allotted $1,108 millions^to the
eight countries in North Africa; $179 million to twelve
nations of the Western African area, $684 million to eleven
nations in Central Africa, and $442 million to five nations
in Southern Africa (see Table 3.3). Clearly, the West
Africa region received the least amount of this economic
aid allotment. The U.S. realistically contends that
economics and politics are inseparable and the the U.S. and
the West are uniquely qualified to responds to Africa's
needs. The U.S. African goal of development depicts that
Africa's security is vital to the U.S. national interest.
The U. S. readily accept the fact that African economic
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crisis threatens most of its policy goals in search for
peace in Southern Africa (see Table 3.2 specific country
and allocation of U.S. aid).
Under the Food for Peace program, Washington
declares that the purpose is to alleviate the immediate
needs of millions of starving people, at the same time
promote long-term solutions to Africa's economic problems.
The U.S. in this regard did not allow political
differences, with any government in Africa, to weaken its
determination to provide assistance. This claim is
directed at Ethiopia whose government has been "hostile" to
the U.S. since change of government in 1974 . Since Haile
Selassie's regime was replaced by Mengistu, Ethiopia has
moved closer to communist bloc and this is a threat to
American security interest. In achieving this objective
the U.S. created funds to allow a flexible response to food
emergencies. It financed transportation costs, created a
government task force to provide better forecasts of food
shortages and needs, and established an advisory group of
business leaders to share information on Africa and the
rest of the Third World hunger and food production.
Although this is purely a humanitarian gesture on the part
of the U.S., it also aims to use aid as incentives to those
recipient governments to support U.S. policy goals in the
areas towards them.
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Ghana in West Africa was the only country listed to
have received food donation and sales from 1975 to 1983.
Egypt, Morocco, Somalia and Sudan were recipient nations in
Northern Africa while Kenya and Zaire received the aid in
Central Africa (see Table 3.1).
Chester A. Crocker when emphasizing the importance
of Africa asserted that Africa offers a growing field for
trade and economic cooperation with the United States. The
United States needs to buy African raw materials. South
Africa remains very vital to this issue.
The U.S. trade with South Africa includes a number
of consumer goods: sugar, wool, gem diamonds, spun acrylic
yarn, molasses, cotton shirts and trousers. South Africa
has as a comparative advantage in mineral and mining
processing.
The leading U.S. purchases from South Africa during
1985 were:
13
Legislative Options and United st-at-ps Policv
S;f Soutn_Atrica, Committee on Foreign Affairs:
Subcommittee on international Economic Policy and Trade
and on Africa 99th Congress, 2nd Session, April-June, 1986,
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Gem diamonds $286 million
Krugerrands $102 million
Ferrochromiun $85 million
Uranium oscide $75 million
Uranium compounds $65 million
U.S. manufactured goods returned $47 million
Industrial diamond, natural $45 million
Coal $43 million
Ferromanganese $32 million
Purchase of these mineral resources from South
Africa clearly depicts that it is in the interest to
improve relations with South Africa rather than the other
way around.
Nigeria is a major supplier of oil to U.S., second
after Saudia Arabia. Nigeria had once threatened to use oil
as a weapon against the U.S. This was aimed at influencing
Washington to effect policy changes in South Africa. Ivory
Coast, Cameroon and Gabon also are oil producers but the
quantity is largely insignificant compared to the volume of
Nigeria's export. Paradoxically the least policy choice
area (West Africa) is the most indebted nation to America.
This statistic largely points to Nigeria.
Looking at the parameters of U.S policy patterns in
Africa, West Africa remains insignificant to the U.S. The
first realm was that this area was largely colonized by the
most closest of U.S. Western allies Britain and France.
These countries at the attainment of independence are still
indirectly controlled by the West. The West still heavily
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trades and invests in this region. Therefore this region
is politically, and economically affiliated to the West.
Thus, the relationship is safe to U.S. national interest.
The East-West Chessboard has not extended to the
West African region. One may want to discuss the Chadian
issue and containment of Quaddafi. The U.S. and France
have started sending military assistance to Chad. But the
Chadian issue is not comparable to the Angolan conflict.
It is hoped that containment of Quaddafi would not escalate
to other regions. Chadian neighbors, Nigeria in
particular, are not ready for any political strife.
In terms of geopolitics or strategic locations,
Liberia is the only country that has established U.S.
military presence, in order to provide air facilities to
the U.S. Similarly, the Soviet Union enjoys docking
facilities in Guinea Bissau. In Central Africa, the
established Soviet presence are at Equatorial Guinea, Sao
Tome and Principe, Congo and Zambia. In the South, those
are in Angola, Mozambique and Madagascar. In Northern
Africa are Libya and Ethiopia. America's military presence
are noticeable at various areas of Somalia, Egypt, Sudan,
14
Kenya, Zaire and Seychelles Islands. Many of the
strategically located areas have deep-water ports, and good
14
Chester A. Crocker, "FY 1987 Assistance Request
for Sub-Saharan Africa," Current Policy 814, 1986.
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air fields. America counts on these areas for its oil
tanker routes from Persian Gulf to Europe. With this in
mind the rational actor has devised a model in order to
guarantee safety of this area and continental policy.
Table 4.2
Reward and Punishment Model
Punishment Inducement Reward
The aid flow to Egypt clearly depicts this nation's
significances to the Gulf area. Aid allotment to Tunisia,
Morocco and Sudan has been increased since Ethiopia has
changed its political and economic structure, and with
Quaddafi trying to expand Libya's borders. Somalia, Kenya
and Zaire received significant proportions of U.S. aid.
The U.S. in order to punish Libya has refused to deliver
its 1975 military sales to the country (see Table 3.5).
Aid to Ethiopia, except food aid, has been stopped since
Mengistu assumed leadership. And the U.S. has used this
instrument of tied aid in granting loans to African
nations.
As long as the power structure remains the same the
West African region will continue to be insignificant to
the U.S. Should the structures change then the U.S.
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policy patterns can take another course. West Africa does
not need political instability in order to attract the
super powers. The areas where the superpowers have
established their presence are the crisis areas. It is
preferably that the zero-sum game does not extend into the
West African region. This region needs to be rational not
to engage in wars and therefore stay out of the super
power contest for influence. Britain and France will
remain a viable influence in the region, at peace times.
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